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ABSTRACT In the last few years, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are making a revolution as an emerging
technology with many different applications in the military, civilian, and commercial fields. The advent of
autonomous drones has initiated serious challenges, including how to maintain their safe operation during
their missions. The safe operation of UAVs remains an open and sensitive issue since any unexpected
behavior of the drone or any hazard would lead to potential risks that might be very severe. The motivation
behind this work is to propose a methodology for the safety assurance of drones over the Internet (Internet
of drones (IoD)). Two approaches will be used in performing the safety analysis: (1) a qualitative safety
analysis approach and (2) a quantitative safety analysis approach. The first approach uses the international
safety standards, namely, ISO 12100 and ISO 13849 to assess the safety of drone’s missions by focusing
on qualitative assessment techniques. The methodology starts with hazard identification, risk assessment,
risk mitigation, and finally draws the safety recommendations associated with a drone delivery use case.
The second approach presents a method for the quantitative safety assessment using Bayesian networks (BN)
for probabilistic modeling. BN utilizes the information provided by the first approach to model the safety
risks related to UAVs’ flights. An illustrative UAV crash scenario is presented as a case study, followed by
scenario analysis, to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed approach. These two analyses, qualitative
and quantitative, enable all involved stakeholders to detect, explore, and address the risks of UAV flights,
which will help the industry to better manage the safety concerns of UAVs.
INDEX TERMS Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), IoD, safety analysis, Bayesian networks, functional
safety, ISO.
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have become an
extremely popular technology.1 These flying robots have pro-
moted the development of several applications such as sens-
ing, smart cities, surveillance [1], disaster management and
recovery, patrolling, aerial survey, and border security [2].
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Sabu M. Thampi.
1(2018) TopDr.One, ‘‘DRONE SALES STATISTICS’’ [Online].
Available: https://topdr.one/drone-sales-statistics/.
The drone technology is becoming increasingly popular,
and UAVs are anticipated to be even more widely adopted
in the future. This is confirmed by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) in the US, which expects that the
number of UAVs consumers will increase from 1.1 million
to 3.55 million between 2016 and 2021.2
2(2018) William Atkinson, ‘‘Drones Are Gaining Popularity’’ [Online].
Available: https://www.ecmag.com/section/your-business/drones-are-
gaining-popularity.
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The advent of autonomous UAVs offers significant bene-
fits; however, there are still open challenges that restrain their
real-world deployment. Because of the limited computational
resources of these low cost drones, their integration with
the Internet-of-Things and the cloud is an emerging trend.
There have been a very few attempts to integrate drones
with the Internet and IoT [3]. In [4]–[6], the authors devel-
oped a cloud robotics platform, Dronemap Planner (DP),
that allows the monitoring, communication and real-time
control of robots and drones over the Internet. Dronemap
integrates UAVs with the cloud and aims to virtualize the
access to UAVs, and offload heavy computations from the
UAVs to the cloud. In [7], the authors proposed a cloud
system for real-time monitoring of multi-drone systems used
for the tracking of moving objects. The advent of autonomous
drones has initiated serious challenges like safety and
security [8].
For this purpose, the safety of drones operations must
be ensured, as part of non-functional properties of the sys-
tem [9]. Safety can be defined as a ‘‘state in which the system
is not in danger or at risk, free of injuries or losses’’ [10].
Because nothing is totally safe and there is no situation where
no risk can occur, safety is also defined as the absence of
unacceptable risks [11], [12].
In fact, the use of civilian drones is still in its
infancy [13], [14]. In addition, UAVs are special categories
of cyber-physical systems that communicate using wireless,
which makes them more prone to safety risks and security
threats [15]. Since this is a relatively new emerging field,
hazards and risks of UAV flights are still not completely
known nor understood, which might jeopardize the safety of
UAV missions, especially due to the absence of standards
and regulations that govern the safe use and operation of
UAVs [16]. This is the main reason behind the limited uti-
lization of drones for civilian purposes3 [17].
Moreover, the lack of policies, standards and guidelines
that govern the safe use, operation and emerging safety prob-
lems of civilian drones creates a significant barrier to research
and development [18]. The limits of today’s approaches to
safety have also been clearly demonstrated by the grow-
ing list of safety accidents and incidents [16]. According
to FAA,4 more than 4,889 incidents have been reported
between 2014 and 2017, which can easily inflict serious harm
to people or properties.
For this reason, safety should be considered as a core
requirement in every system or application design, and even
more for systems that can provoke great damages [10]. Thus,
without a clear understanding of potential risks of usage of
these drones, the public use of civilian drones will not be
possible at an acceptable safety level.
3(2011) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). [Online]. Available:
https://www.trade.gov/td/otm/assets/aero/UAS2011.pdf
4(2017) Civilian Drone Safety Incidents Keep Rising. [Online]. Available:
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2017/12/08/473529.htm
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MOTIVATION
The safety assessment is an initial step to regulate the safe
use of UAVs. Different strategies have been proposed with
respect to the safety assessment of UAVs, i.e. assessing the
risk of an undesired event in a system, using both quanti-
tative [19], [20] and qualitative [10], [21]–[24] approaches.
For instance, the FAA developed a pre-flight assessment
process in which the SafetyManagement System (SMS)5 was
adopted to identify the risks and the risk mitigation strate-
gies to ensure that no safety hazards will occur during the
UAV mission. In [21], Mhenni et al. recommended a frame-
work for regulating the safety of UAV operations, includ-
ing a Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) and a
Model-Based Safety Analysis (MBSA), integrating quanti-
tative techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and
qualitative techniques such as Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis (FMEA).
Gonçalves et al. [19] presented a safety assessment pro-
cess model for a UAV using Petri Nets, while [20] used
Bayesian Belief Networks for performing risk analysis of
small unmanned aircraft systems.
Some works such as [22] [23] proposed the identification
and assessment of UAV risk-factors (as obstacle collision,
untimely battery drain, human factor) based on qualitative
analysis. The current FAA Order 8040 approach to risk man-
agement is also based on fundamentally qualitative and sub-
jective risk analysis [24]. The qualitative nature of the current
approach might lead to results that fail to be repeatable,
predictable, and transparent.
On the other hand, a rigorous safety assessment also
requires a quantitative analysis [25]. This is even confirmed
by [24], which recommends establishing quantitative proba-
bilistic risk analyses. Therefore, for completeness purposes,
we concluded that it is necessary to conduct detailed stud-
ies on the UAV safety assessment at both qualitative and
quantitative levels. In this paper, we follow a combination of
qualitative and quantitative analyses to identify hazards and
risks that can occur when drones are tele-operated over the
Internet (IoD). We propose safety procedures, safeguards and
protective measures to reduce the risk to an acceptable level.
We also investigate the main reasons that might lead to drone
crashes, and analyze them in order to identify mitigation
measures that must be taken into account to avoid crashes
and accidents. Moreover, we identify probabilistic metrics of
drone crash events given some states of the system.
B. APPROACH AND CONTRIBUTIONS
To address this problem, we propose two approaches: The
first approach is qualitative and is based on the functional
safety standards ISO 12100 and ISO 13849. The second
approach is quantitative and is based on Bayesian Networks.
5(2014) FAA Administration, ‘‘Sms safety management
system manual version 4.0,’’ [Online]. Available: https:
//www.faa.gov/airports/airport safety/safety management systems/
external/pilot studies/documentation/jqf/media/jqfSMSdraftmanual.pdf.
VOLUME 7, 2019 53393
A. Allouch et al.: Qualitative and Quantitative Risk Analysis and Safety Assessment of UAVs Missions Over the Internet
1) BASELINE STANDARDS AND APPROACHES
The new Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC requires a risk
assessment for a machine. ISO 121006 is a type A standard
that applies to everything that is defined as a machine under
the EuropeanMachinery Directive. It is used for machines for
which there is no type C standard, i.e. no standard dedicated
to the specific product or machine under consideration [26].
In our case, there is no type C standard dedicated to the
drones, thus we propose to adapt ISO 12100 for the func-
tional safety assessment of drones. This standard specifies the
basic terminologies and principles of the risk assessment and
the risk reduction for ensuring safety in machinery design.
These principles are based on the knowledge and experience,
past accidents and incidents, and hazards associated with the
machinery.
To comply with the machinery directives requirements,
the harmonized standard ISO 138497 is the most relevant
from the functional safety point of view as compared to
IEC 615088, which is not a harmonized European standard.
It cannot be used as a proof of the CE conformity (European
Conformity). It is to be noted that a harmonised standard is
an European standard that demonstrates how a product or a
machine complies with the European Conformity. The
ISO 13849 standard is internationally recognized and is a
Performance Level (PL)-focused standard whose outcomes
can be equated to IEC Safety Integrity Level (SIL) standards,
which makes it even more useful. ISO 13849 is a standard
that can cover most, if not all, concerns of the machine
manufacturer (OEM: Original Equipment Manufacturer)9 in
factory automation safety controls. It combines the complex
probabilitymethod from IEC 61508 and the deterministic cat-
egory approach from EN 954-1 based on the risk assessment.
Unlike many of the other international standards,
ISO 13849 is used for the safety-related parts of control
systems and diverse types of machinery; it applies to all
technologies, while IEC 61511 [27] is specific for the pro-
cess industries and IEC 62061 [28] can only be applied to
electronic components.
Most functional safety assessments are performed in a
qualitative manner, as mentioned in the aforementioned stan-
dards. However, for the sake of comprehensiveness of the
safety analysis, it is also important to complement the quali-
tative analysis by a quantitative analysis.
Quantitative analysis uses model-based techniques for
probability estimation, which allows systems to be analysed
in a more formal way. The Bayesian Networks (BN) formal-
ism is a commonly used approach for quantitative risk assess-
ment [29]–[32]. It captures the relations between faults and
6(2010) Safety and functional safety a general guide. [Online]. Available:
https://library.e.abb.com/public/. . . /1SFC001008B0201.pdf.
7(2018) Machinery Directive & Harmonised Standards. [Online]. Avail-
able: https://www.cem4.eu/component/attachments/download/501.
8(2017) Functional safety, Technical guide No. 10. [Online]. Available:
https://library.e.abb.com/public/acd23f92341a4d50bf3500a245494af8/
EN_TechnicalguideNo10_REVF.pdf.
9Understanding Machine Safety Guidelines. [Online]. https://www.festo.
com/rep/enus_us/assets/pdf/FESTO_eGuide_final2.pdf.
symptoms, identifies and estimates the probabilities of risks
in various scenarios. For this reason, we will use Bayesian
Networks as our quantitative analysis approach for drone’s
safety analysis.
2) OUR METHODOLOGY
Our approach consists in conducting a comprehensive study
of safety aspects for the usage of civilian drones at a public
scale through the Internet. We combine the ISO 13849 and
ISO 12100 standards to derive a unified functional safety
methodology. In addition, a process is proposed for iden-
tifying and classifying hazardous conditions, along with
their possible causes and their consequences that affect the
safe operation of UAVs. Furthermore, the risk mitigation
strategies required to reduce the associated risk to an accept-
able level are outlined to ensure the safety of drone’s mis-
sions when tele-operated and monitored through the Internet.
Based on the output of the first approach, a quantitative eval-
uation method based on Bayesian Networks is then presented
in this paper. The Bayesian model of the UAV crash risk
is developed by causality, and the expected probabilities of
crashes associated with an UAV system is analysed based
on real flight data derived from literature [33]–[37]. Finally,
an illustrative example is demonstrated, and the simulation
results are discussed.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are as
follows:
• First, we propose a qualitative safety analysis for func-
tional safety for drone crashes based on two safety stan-
dards, ISO 12100 and ISO 13849.
• Second, a drone delivery use case is presented as a case
study in order to verify the applicability and the feasibil-
ity of the proposed functional safety methodology.
• Third, we perform a quantitative safety analysis using
Bayesian Networks based on information given by
ISO 12100 and ISO 13849 followed by an illustrative
example for demonstration; finally, simulation results
are discussed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the
recent regulations and research papers related to drones’
safety. The qualitative safety approach is proposed in
Section III and demonstrated by a drone delivery use case.
The Bayesian Networks model is proposed as a quantitative
safety analysis method to validate the proposed functional
safety methodology followed by an UAV scenario analysis to
demonstrate its feasibility. Finally, Section IV provides some
concluding remarks and suggestions for a future work.
II. RELATED WORKS
The emerging drone industry is greatly evolving, yet still in
the process of establishing safety standards. To date, no safety
standard exists for autonomous drone systems. European reg-
ulations are still being drafted [16] and will be centered on
the safety risks posed by drones. Due to the current absence
of international standards, laws and guidelines that govern
the safe use and operation of civilian drones, many groups,
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including companies and researchers, have issued their own
framework for regulating the safety of UAV operations.
A. UAV REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS
AND AUTHORITIES
For maintaining the safety of UAVs and the public, the FAA
in the United States has developed rules to regulate the use
of small UAVs. The FAA has put out a ‘‘Know Before
You Fly program’’10 to provide guidance on the responsible
use of UAV and educate the public about UAV safety. The
FAA requests a preflight assessment with risk mitigation
strategies to ensure that the UAV will pose no risk to aircraft,
people, or property when the UAV loses control or other
safety hazards.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is
an international organization that collaborates with national
civil aviation authorities. It is concerned with basic regulatory
frameworks and provides information and guidelines for Air
Navigation Services. In 2016, the ICAO published an online
toolkit11 that provides general guidelines for regulators and
operators [38]. The same organization further issued recom-
mendations for the safe integration of UAVs into controlled
airspace.
The Joint Authorities for Rule-making on Unmanned Sys-
tems (JARUS) is a group of national authorities that aims
to provide guidance to support and facilitate the creation
of UAV regulations. In particular, they recommend regula-
tions that focus on UAV safety. Further, Euro-control and the
organization JAA (Joint Aviation Authority) created the UAV
Task Force, with the goal of integrating UAVs in European
airspace through setting a guiding report on UAV safety
requirements. In March 2015, the European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) published a regulatory approach for UAVs,
called ‘‘the Concept of Operations for Drones: A risk-based
approach to regulation of unmanned aircraft’’ [39], which
focused on the integration of drones into the existing aviation
system in a safe manner. This was followed by the publication
of the EASA Technical Opinion [40] introducing a Prototype
Regulation on Unmanned Aircraft Operations, published in
Summer 2016.
The FAA and EASA together with EUROCAE, USICO,
JARUS, ICAO, and UVS International have defined formal
policies for UAV certification and a clear regulation for the
National Air Space (NAS) management. However, the new
regulations proposals will be officially published when EU
and US adopts it. These recommended regulations are avail-
able and used as common guidelines until the legislation
publication.
B. INTERNATIONAL SAFETY STANDARDS
In Europe, to commercialize a machine (robot), it is required
to get a CE certification in accordance with the European
10Know before you fly. Accessed: 19 January 2017. [Online]. Available:
www.knowbeforeyoufly.com.
11www.icao.int/rpas.
Directive on machinery 2006/42/EC [41], which states that
risk-management techniques should be achieved.
There are two alternative standards bodies that can be
followed when implementing functional safety systems in
compliance with the Machinery Directive: The International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) standard and the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard.12
Considering the nature of UAVs as vehicles or mobile
machines, the ISO/IEC standards are highly recommended as
they give confidence to the regulatory bodies to deliver cer-
tification that ensures compliance with relevant regulations,
helps to protect the public, and can be adapted to be applied to
UAV outdoor missions. The main functional safety standards
in current use are listed below:
• IEC 61508: Functional safety of electrical/electronic/
programmable electronic safety-related systems [42].
• ISO 61511: Functional safety, safety instrumented sys-
tems for the process industry sector [27].
• EN ISO 13849: Safety of machinery, safety-related parts
of control systems, General principles for design [43].
• EN 954-1: Safety of machinery, safety-related parts of
control systems, General principles for design [44].
• EN 62061: Safety of machinery, functional safety of
safety-related electrical, electronic and programmable
electronic control systems [45].
• ISO 26262: Road Vehicles functional safety
standard [46].
Every standard for functional safety-related control sys-
tems requires a risk assessment. It is mandatory to perform a
risk assessment for a machine according to the new Machin-
ery Directive 2006/42/EC.13 Basic safety standards for risk
assessment include:
• ISO 12100: Safety of machinery-general principles for
design-risk assessment and risk reduction [26].
• ISO 14121: Safety of machinery, risk assessment [47].
• ISO 31000: Risk management-principles and
guidelines [48].
C. RISK ANALYSIS APPROACH FOR UAV OPERATIONS
In both national and international standards, the risk assess-
ment approach is an initial step to regulate the safe use
of UAVs. Several approaches have been proposed in the
field of safety assessment of UAVs. In [21], Mhenni et al.
used drones as a case study to design a framework termed
SafeSysE, which merges safety assessment and systems engi-
neering to provide safety aspects. The objective of this paper
is to develop an approach that automatically generates safety
artefacts by adding safety-related concepts to the system.
This approach includes a Model-Based Systems Engineering
(MBSE) [49] and a Model-Based Safety Analysis (MBSA)
[50]. This approach integrates techniques such as Failure
12(2010) ABB brochure, ‘‘Safety and functional safety: A general
guide,’’ Tech. Rep., [Online]. Available: https://library.e.abb.
com/public/acd23f92341a4d50bf3500a245494af8/ EN Technicalguide
No10 REVF.pdf.
13(2010) Safety and functional safety a general guide. [Online]. Available:
https://library.e.abb.com/public/. . . /1SFC001008B0201.pdf.
VOLUME 7, 2019 53395
A. Allouch et al.: Qualitative and Quantitative Risk Analysis and Safety Assessment of UAVs Missions Over the Internet
Mode, Effects Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis for safety
analysis. This process is not fully prototyped and has not been
tested in real scenarios. In our case, we designed a safety
assurance framework and applied our methodology to real-
world scenarios.
Theworks presented in [10] and [51], used ISO 31000 stan-
dards and their approach included identification, assess-
ment and reduction procedures. The papers show how this
approach has been applied in agriculture to find the sources
of hazards when using UAVs in performing agricultural mis-
sions. However, the papers only provided a description of
each step in the approach without any specific details on
how to be validated. The experimental prototype is missing
as the paper does not demonstrate a real scenario. In the
current paper, we combined two standards ISO 13849 and
ISO 12100 to derive a functional safety methodology for
drone operations, and after that we applied this methodology
to a real UAV use case.
In [20], the authors proposed two approaches, qualitative
and quantitative, in performing the risk analysis process for
small unmanned aircraft systems. The first one used a safety-
risk management process to identify hazards and the second
approach used a comprehensive probabilistic model based
on Bayesian network for risk estimation. The proposed sys-
tem mainly addressed some hazards without, assigning risk
level for each hazard, specifying the correspondent mitigation
strategies nor functional safety, while in the current paper,
we perform a detailed risk analysis of UAV controlled over
the internet including some IoD-specific hazards based on
international safety standards. In [22], the authors focused
on the identification of human factors errors and mitigation
techniques in UAV systems.
Sankararaman and Krishnakumar [23], developed a frame-
work for identifying and predicting the occurrence of various
risk factors that affect the safe operation of UAVs. Their
work only analyses a simple case of risk factors, i.e. battery
discharging and collision while in our paper we treat various
risk factors and hazards that affect the operation of UAVs.
III. SAFETY ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
Our methodology consists in using two approaches for safety
analysis: (1) a qualitative functional safety analysis approach,
and (2) a quantitative analysis based on the Bayesian Net-
works approach.
The first approach combines the safety standards
ISO 12100 and ISO 13849.We conduct an analysis to identify
the hazardous conditions, alongwith their possible causes and
their consequences that affect the safe operation of UAVs.
In addition, risk mitigation strategies required to reduce
the associated risk to an acceptable level are outlined and
associated with the illustrative UAV use case, i.e. courier
delivery with the drone.
The second approach is a quantitative evaluation method
based on Bayesian Networks used to model the safety risks
related to UAV flights and to estimate the probabilities of the
UAV risk of crash. A Bayesian model was designed based
FIGURE 1. The Functional Safety Methodology based on ISO 12100 and
ISO 13849.
on the output of the hazard identification step defined in
the first approach (refer to Figure 1), to conduct a more
detailed analysis of the relations between the risks of drone’s
crashes and their causes. Using this model, we assess theUAV
crash probability on an illustrative scenario. For background
information about the ISO 12100 and 13849 standards and
Bayesian Networks, the reader may refer to references [26],
[52] and [53].
In what follows, we will first present the qualitative func-
tional safety approach, and then the quantitative Bayesian
approach. The video demonstration of this methodology is
available at [54].
A. QUALITATIVE SAFETY ANALYSIS: FUNCTIONAL
SAFETY APPROACH
The proposed approach consists in a structured methodology
that combines the ISO 13849 and ISO 12100 standards in
order to derive the safety requirements of the drone opera-
tions when tele-operated and monitored through the Internet
(see Figure 1).
DESCRIPTION OF THE ILLUSTRATIVE USE CASE
To illustrate the functional safety methodology approach,
a drone delivery use case is used to validate the effectiveness
of the proposed approach, since the drone delivery service
has become an emerging topic for different companies. As a
matter of fact, Google14, DHL post service in Germany [55]
14(2015) Google delivery drone. [Online]. Available:
http://www.techspot.com/news/62412-two-delivery-drones-built-google-
soontested-us.html
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TABLE 1. Limits of the drone system.
TABLE 2. Analysis of hazards sources.
and Amazon in the U.S.,15 and many others are using drones
to deliver packages to customers.
We consider the case of a drone that goes from a source
location to a destination in an urban city, and will fly at
an altitude less than 100 meters. The drone may fly on top
of people, highways, streets, etc. When possible the path
of the drone will be planned above non populated zones,
but it might also fly over people to use the shortest path.
The deployment conditions are important to consider when
evaluating the hazards and their corresponding risks as it
will determine the severity of the risks. In fact, flying above
populated area will induce risks that are more critical than
if flying on top of forests or deserts. We also assume that the
drone communicates with the cloud using 4G connection, and
the cloud relay the stream coming from the drone to a ground
station/user. This architecture is similar to that proposed
in [4], [5].
It has to be noted that this use case is merely illustrative
and can be applied to other uses cases of drones applications
controlled over the Internet. We assume that the drone is
connected to the user through the Internet, which imposes
additional challenges that may lead to hazards such as net-
work delays and message losses. We will discuss these issues
in our analysis of the two approaches.
15(2015) Amazon. [Online]. Available: http://appleinsider.com/articles/
15/11/30/amazon-teases-new-details-of-planned-prime-air-drone-delivery-
service.
As shown in Figure 1, the functional safety methodol-
ogy has two phases: (i.) Phase 1 is related to the standard
ISO 12100, (ii.) Phase 2 pertains to the standard ISO 13849.
In what follows, we describe the functional safety analysis of
the two phases for the drone delivery use case.
1) PHASE 1: THE ISO 12100 STANDARD
a: RISK ANALYSIS
First, according to ISO 12100, a risk analysis must be car-
ried out, which starts with system limits specification. The
drone’s system limits are depicted in Table. 1. According
to [10], the drone limits can be divided into five categories:
(i.) Physical, (ii.) Temporal, (iii.) Environmental and
(iv.) Behavioral limits, (iv.) Networking limits. Table 1
explains the five categories and provides concrete examples
and description of the limits. It has to be noted that the
networking limits are related to the communication with the
drones through the Internet, as comparedwith traditional line-
of-sight point-to-point communication.
The second step of the risk analysis consists in per-
forming hazard identification. Table 2 provides the list of
potential drone hazards according to their sources, exter-
nal and internal. This list was identified using reactive
methods.
Reactive methods are incidents and accidents databases,
safety and flight reports, survey, maintenance reports [56].
In what follows, we provide a list of commonly used reactive
methods:
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• Accidents and incidents databases: (i.) Federal Avi-
ation Administration preliminary reports of Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Accidents and Incidents (FAA UAS
A&I) database, (ii.) National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB), (iii.) FAA’s Aviation Safety Information
Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) database, (iv.) FAA’s
Accident and Incident Data System (AIDS) and Drone
Crash Database.16
• Safety and flight reports: (i.) NASA’s Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS), (ii.) Annual Insurance
Report17 and (iii.) ICAO Safety Report.18
• Maintenance reports: FAA’s Aviation Maintenance
Reports.19
• Surveys: NTSB’s Review of Aircraft Accident
Data20, FAA’s Summary of Unmanned Aircraft Acci-
dent/Incident Data21 and review of previous research
papers [33]–[37].
This list can be used in a straightforward manner as a
checklist during hazard identification to particularly prevent
inexperienced users of the drone from missing important
hazards. In Table 3 and Table 4, we present several possi-
ble hazardous events and risk factors and their respective
categories, including temporary short-time GPS loss dur-
ing flight, permanent loss of GPS during flight, degraded
communication quality, permanent loss of communication
with ground station, security attack on the drone, loss of
UAV electrical power, autopilot controller module failure,
failure/inability to avoid collision, pilot error, midair collision
and weather effects on UAV that affect the operation of the
drone during the delivery mission. It has to be noted that
the risk assessment levels, severity levels and probabilities
in Table 3 and Table 4 are assigned based on our personal
understanding of the illustrated use case considered in this
study.
For the case of a drone delivery, drones are controlled
over the Internet; hazards such as degradation of communica-
tion quality can appear caused by networking issues such as
network delays, limited bandwidth and network congestion
that affects negatively the drone performance and operation
causing collision with buildings and damage to UAV.
The third step of the risk analysis is the UAV risk estima-
tion, which measures the underlying probabilities and sever-
ity levels of the consequences of the identified safety hazards
16(2016) Drone Crash Database. [Online]. Available:
https://dronewars.net/drone-crash-database/.
17(2012) Annual Insurance Report. [Online]. Available:
http://www.modelaircraft.org/files/500-q.pdf.
18(2014) ICAO Safety Report. [Online]. Available:
http://www.icao.int/safety/Documents/ICAO_2014%20Safety%20Report
_final_02042014_web.pdf.
19(2016). Aviation Maintenance Alerts. [Online]. Available:
https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/safety/alerts/aviation_maintenance/.
20(2011) [Online]. Available: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/data/
Documents/ARA1401.pdf.
21(2018) [Online]. Available: https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives
/maintenance_hf/library/documents/media/human_factors_maintenance/a
_summary_of_unmanned_aircraft_accidentincident_data.human_factors
_implications.doc.
of the drone operation. According to the ISO 12100 standard,
the risk estimation consists in determining two parameters:
(i.) the risk severity and (ii.) risk probability.
The risk severity level is estimated based on the injury
level or the harmful impact on people, drone and environ-
ment. The severity of the hazard is usually affected by the
consequences. We adopt the following four categories and
their definitions of the severity levels:
• Catastrophic: the hazard causes harm or serious
injuries or deaths to humans. The severity of such haz-
ards is the highest considering that it affects human
safety and thusmust be carefully addressed and removed
to avoid fatal situations. For example, consider the case
of the drone delivery use case where the drone has to
fly on top of highways. The permanent loss of commu-
nication with the Ground Station (due to control system
failure, electromagnetic interference, . . . ) may lead to a
catastrophic situation as it results in having the drone
falling on the road and thus leading to accidents. These
accidents could result into injuries yet also deaths, which
makes the severity catastrophic, if no failsafe operations
are implemented.
• Critical: the event has effect on third parties other
than people, like for example making damage to build-
ing or assets in general. As an example, consider the
navigation of the drone in space at relatively low altitude
and the hazard that the anti-collision sensors stop func-
tioning. This hazard can lead to a collision and a crash
against a building and may lead to damages to assets if
it falls on the ground, or breaking some window glasses
of the building, and thus is tagged of a critical severity.
• Marginal: the event causes damages to the drone system
itself. For example, when the drone is landing in a certain
open space, it is possible to lose control due to interfer-
ence to IMU and altitude sensors or GPS signals, which
may lead to the case of crashing against the ground. This
hazard will only lead to crashing the drone or some of its
part, with no damages on third parties or people. Then,
its severity is tagged as marginal.
• Negligible: the event does not affect the operational
capability of the drone but causes minor effects on drone
system performance (mission degradation). For exam-
ple, the number of GPS satellites may decrease in some
areas with high building which may affect the accuracy
of localization of the drone in space. This hazard does
not lead to crashes by usually it leads to temporary high
localization error that remain acceptable. This hazard is
tagged as negligible.
It has to be noted that the risk severity is particularly
susceptible to bias or incorrect assumptions, as severity is
generally subject to a qualitative analysis of an event and open
to interpretations [57]. In fact, the severity may also depend
on the context. For example, we have tagged the severity
level of the degraded communication quality as critical, given
the context it is operated on top of highways. Changing
the navigation context of the application to being on top of
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TABLE 3. Application of functional safety methodology for drone delivery application.
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TABLE 4. Application of functional safety methodology for drone delivery application.
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FIGURE 2. A typical risk assessment scoring matrix (based on
ISO 12100 Safety of Machinery).22
forest or areas not having people, the severity may be tagged
in this case to marginal as it will lead only to drone crashing.
Thus, when applying the methodology, the severity has to
consider all playing factors of the use case and deployment
assumptions to be accurately interpreted.
On the other hand, the risk probability is defined as the
likelihood that the consequence of the safety hazard might
occur.
As the analysis is qualitative, the probabilities are not
expressed as numerical values, but as attributes. According
to [58], the range of probabilities of occurrence is divided into
five main classes:
• Frequent: the event is likely to occur many times or has
occurred frequently,
• Probable: likely to occur regularly but not frequent,
• Occasional: likely to occur sometimes or has occurred
infrequently,
• Remote: unlikely to occur but possible or has occurred
rarely,
• Improbable: very unlikely to occur or not known to have
occurred.
As a first example, we consider the hazard of a permanent
loss of GPS signals during flight, which may result in a drone
losing direction and crashes (see Table 3 and Table 4). A GPS
loss could potentially result in a collision with an aircraft,
UAS, or a damage to UAV or environment and ground, and
even humans, thus severity is catastrophic. In the condition
of open air environment and hovering at high altitude, losing
GPS signals could be seen as remote. Using the risk assess-
ment matrix of Figure 2, the risk of GPS loss is thus assessed
as ‘‘serious’’.
As a second example, the degradation of the communi-
cation quality is another hazard related to the context of
the Internet-of-Drones. The degradation of QoS may be
due to several reasons such as network congestion, delays,
jitters, communication instability, etc. Assuming to use
22A Matter of Risk Assessment, Liability & Compliance: Machine
Safety Labeling in the 21st Century. Accessed: JULY 23, 2014. [Online].
Available: https://www.automation.com/automation-news/article/a-matter-
of-risk-assessment-liability-compliance-machine-safety-labeling-in-the-
21st-century.
a 4G connection, the communication quality is most often
stable and reliable, but be subject to perturbation in areas
with bad coverage or due to signal attenuation. Therefore,
this hazard can be seen to occur occasionally for a typical 4G
connection. The degradation of the communication quality
may result in critical consequences (i.e. Severity is critical)
as it results in intermediate interruption of the monitoring
during an autonomous mission and can lead to collision with
buildings. Using the risk assessment matrix of Figure 2,
the risk caused by degradation of communication quality is
estimated to ‘‘serious’’. Of course, using another type of
communication that is less reliable, would lead to a different
risk estimation.
The result of the risk assessment phase consists of a pri-
oritized list of hazards and their corresponding risk levels,
as shown in Table 3 and Table 4.
b: RISK EVALUATION
The risk evaluation step is defined based on the results of the
risk estimation step. In this evaluation step, we identify all
the risks that are not tolerable and then we will process them
in the risk reduction step. If all the risks are acceptable, then,
there is no need to proceed further (refer to Figure 1).
c: RISK REDUCTION
After the evaluation of risks, the next step deals with the risk
reduction. The process consists in identifying the hazards that
led to an unacceptable level of harm; then, try to reduce the
risk to a tolerable level.
The risk reduction measures for the drone delivery use case
are described below. According to ISO 12100, there are three
steps to follow for risk mitigation: (1) inherently safe design
measures, (2) safeguarding and (3) information for use [12].
In the first step, the strategy consists in following safe
design approaches without the use of safeguards or protective
measures to reduce the risk to an acceptable level in the
design phase, and to ensure the safety of the system. These
approaches include:
• Perform a safe design of the drone in order to improve
its stability, to avoid causing harms to a person.
• Prototyping and verification.
• Visual inspection for verifying and checking the design
content in case problems arise with the drone before
flying.
Applying the above principles in our context; in the case
of Internet-of-Drones, where communication occurs through
the Internet, it is important to use a designed network
with a guaranteed quality of service in terms of delay and
throughput.
Then, the network design must be verified to ensure that
it operates as expected. The verification and prototyping
can be done through extensive network simulations. Further-
more, as part of the visual inspection, it is important to con-
stantly monitor the quality of service of the communication
in real-time to avoid any possible hazard resulting from bad
communication.
VOLUME 7, 2019 53401
A. Allouch et al.: Qualitative and Quantitative Risk Analysis and Safety Assessment of UAVs Missions Over the Internet
In the second step, it is recommended to take possible
safeguards and (technical) protective measures that help to
mitigate remaining risks. In ISO 12100, the safeguards are
defined as ‘‘protective measures to protect persons from
the hazards which cannot reasonably be eliminated or risks
which cannot be sufficiently reduced by inherently safe design
measures’’ [26]. For example, for the case of midair colli-
sion risk, we can use parachute, airbags, or protection nets
as possible safeguards and protective measures. Collision
avoidance sensors and propeller guards can be used to avoid
collisions to walls.
In the case of 4G communication, it is possible to imple-
ment failsafe mechanisms to prevent from risk of crashes,
reduce any further damage of UAV and ensure the safe drone
operation, for example, the drone should land or return to
home in case of loss of wireless communication.
In the third step, information for uses are necessary to
reduce risk and ensures the safe drone operation. According
to ISO 12100, ‘‘information for uses are protective measures
consisting of lists of elements of information (for example,
text, words, instructions, warning signs, markings and labels,
audible or visual signals) used to convey information to the
user, which may be essential for keeping risks on an accept-
able low risk level’’ [26]. In the case of 4G communication,
it is possible to implement information for use measures,
which are classified into three categories:
• Preflight: Before the flight, it is important to make
sure that the communication quality is up to a certain
acceptable level before starting the mission. In case of
bad communication is detected through sensor readings
signals, the drone will be prevented from taking-off and
starting its mission until the communication is resumed
at a good level.
• During the mission: The communication qual-
ity should be monitored in real-time and in case of a high
degradation, the drone should operate autonomously in
a safe manner without depending on the control of the
ground station/user.
• Post-flight: After the mission is completed, the
log files can be analyzed to understand the reasons
behind the occurrence of risks during themission (if any)
and develop additional protective measures to avoid bad
consequences when similar risks occur in the future.
In the case of loss of UAV electrical power, warning system
for alerting UAV pilot of battery failure are required and
real time battery information can be useful to take necessary
actions to avoid the consequence of this hazard.
In Table 3 and Table 4, we present all measures that might
be suitable for reducing the risks of the identified hazardous
events. We remind that the risk assessments, the severity lev-
els and probabilities are detected based on our understanding
of the illustrative use case of drone delivery.
After completion of risk assessment and risk reduction
following ISO 12100, the result of risk reduction is required
to implement protective measures (safeguards) employing
safety functions (are often called safety-related parts of
control systems (SRP/CS)) in order to eliminate hazard
and/or reduce risk. This will lead to part of ISO 13849
(Phase 2) to provide safety specifications and guidance on
the determination of a required (adequate) level of Functional
Safety in the form of a required Performance Level (PLr).
2) PHASE 2: THE ISO 13849 STANDARD
a: SAFETY FUNCTIONS IDENTIFICATION
The first step of ISO 13849 is to identify the safety functions
to be performed by SRP/CS. The safety functions can be
used as safeguarding and protective measures. The best way
is to take this information directly from the results of risk
reduction measures performed in the ISO 12100 phase (Refer
to Table 3 and Table 4).
b: PERFORMANCE LEVEL REQUIRED SPECIFICATION
Once the safety functions are identified, the required perfor-
mance level (PLr) must be calculated to specify the ability of
safety-related parts of the system to perform a safety function
under foreseeable conditions [52].
In other words, the PLr refers to the performance level that
must be applied to attain the required risk reduction for each
safety function. The required performance levels depend on
the expected risk that originates from each hazard and has to
be determined based on the risk estimation.
According to ISO 13849, the required performance level
PLr is estimated using a risk graph, as presented in Fig. 3.
The PLr is determined by estimating the three parame-
ters [52]: (i.) severity of possible injury (S), (ii.) frequency
of exposure to hazard (F) and (iii.) the possibility of avoiding
the hazard (P), for each safety function:
• Severity of possible injury (S): If the severity of injury is
high or induce death, S2 is selected, but S1 is selected if
the severity of injury is low.
• Frequency of exposure to hazard (F): Reflect the drone’s
degree of frequency and/or exposure to the hazard.
F2 should be selected if the drone is frequently or con-
tinuously exposed to the hazard, but F1 is selected if the
time of exposure to the hazard is short.
• Possibility of avoiding the hazard (P): when a hazardous
situation occurs, P1 should only be selected if there is
a realistic chance of avoiding an accident or of signifi-
cantly reducing its effect. P2 should be selected if there
is almost no chance of avoiding the hazard.
The final output of the risk graph in Fig.3 will indicate a
performance level required PLr, which is used to denote what
performance level is required by the safety function, which
is graded ‘‘a’’to‘‘e’’. Clearly, the greater the risk of exposure
to a hazard, the higher the performance of the safety related
control needs to be.
Let us consider a case of wireless communication that
is not reliable to illustrate the process on how to estimate
the PLr. In the case of a degraded communication quality
due to networking issues, failsafe mechanism is a safety
function that must be designed to reduce the risk related
to networking issues. The degradation of communication
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FIGURE 3. Risk graph for determining the Required performance level for
a safety function from ISO 13849.23
quality can cause damage to UAVwhich correspond to sever-
ity level S1. A degraded communication quality could fre-
quently be expected to occur whichmake the drone frequently
exposed to this hazard (F2). When this hazard occurs, there
is no possibility to avoid it (P2). According to the risk graph
in Fig.3, the PLr required by the failsafe mechanism for
eliminating hazardous situation is ‘‘c’’.
One of the most dangerous hazards to pilots is the mid-
air collision, which may occur remotely between two UAS
systems (frequency is F1). Depending on the nature of the
collision, they can result in the loss of one or both of the
aircraft. A secondary accident usually following mid-air col-
lisions is ground impact, that may injure people and damage
property. Potential damages resulting from all these accidents
include injury or fatality of people on the ground or on-board
another aircraft, damage or loss of the vehicle and damage
to property which correspond to severity level S2. When
this hazard occurs, there is no possibility to avoid it (P2).
According to the risk graph in Fig.3, the PLr required by the
safeguards (Parachute, airbags, or protection nets and colli-
sion avoidance sensors) for eliminating hazardous situation
is ‘‘d’’.
Finally, the functional safety system must be documented.
Table 3 and Table 4 contains all information carried out in the
safety risk assessment process to derive a functional safety
system.
Using these two standards, risk analysis is made in a
qualitative manner. However, these standards also demand a
quantitative analysis of risk. Bayesian networks can be used
to quantify and improve the qualitative risk assessment.
B. QUANTITATIVE SAFETY ANALYSIS: BAYESIAN
NETWORKS APPROACH
As mentioned earlier, the qualitative method based on the
functional safety assessment does not give a comprehensive
analysis and must be complemented with a quantitative anal-
ysis. In this section, we propose a quantitative risk analysis
method based on a Bayesian Networks approach to conduct
a more detailed analysis of the relationships among risk of
23What are functional safety standards for servo drives?.
Accessed: JANUARY 18, 2017. [Online]. Available:
https://www.motioncontroltips.com/faqwhatarefunctionalsafetystandards-
forservodrives/.].
drone crashes and their causes to prevent the crash from
occurring. First, based on the safety analysis output described
in ISO 12100 and ISO 13849, the Bayes model of the UAV
crash risk is created by causality; data were populated by col-
lecting and reviewing civil UAV accidents and the expected
probability of occurrence of a crash associated with UAV
system deduced. Second, a typical example of causal and
diagnostic inference was demonstrated. Third, a scenario
analysis was established for demonstration purposes. Finally,
the result of the sensitivity analysis is discussed.
1) THE BAYESIAN NETWORKS TOPOLOGY
The BN model is typically composed of target, observable
and intermediate nodes [31]. Target nodes are nodes that
represent variables for which a probability distribution is
computed (Probability of drone crash).
Observable nodes represent variables that are measur-
able or directly observable. These nodes provide the infor-
mation necessary to compute the prior probability of events
connected. Intermediate nodes are mainly defined to help
manage the size of the conditional probability tables (CPT),
because too many parent nodes with their states result in
massive CPT structures that are difficult to visualize. So,
combining the parent nodes into fewer intermediate nodes
based on causal structures is a practical solution. Following
these instructions, we establish causal BN model between
target, observable and intermediate nodes to predict the risk
of a crash of UAV during a mission in different conditions.
Figure 4 describes the network topology that captures the
causal factors to produce a probability of a UAV crash due
to failure. Observing from top to bottom, the observable
nodes provide the information necessary to compute the prior
probability of connected events. Each node has a set of dis-
crete states (NO state; cause or fault is absent) and (YES
state; cause or fault is present). For example, the state pilot
error will have the value YES in case of pilot error and
NO otherwise. Data necessary to drive UAV risk model can
be obtained based on expert knowledge, experiments or by
learning from historical data. Thus, the next step involves the
data collection.
2) DATA COLLECTION
The Safety Management Document provided by ICAO24
indicates that past accident and incident data collection is
a key step and vital source of data, as they give plenty of
information that can be helpful to validate the UAV risk
analysis study.
Due to limitation (or probably absence) of concrete data of
drone crashes it is very challenging to derive exact probabili-
ties of events [24]. Thus, based on review of many references,
we set some illustrative probabilities (or frequencies) to show
how to apply the methodology, which is abstract and remain
24(2013) Safety management manual (doc 9859). [Online].
Available: www.icao.int/safety/SafetyManagement/Documents/Doc.9859.
3rd%20Edition.alltext.en.pdf.
VOLUME 7, 2019 53403
A. Allouch et al.: Qualitative and Quantitative Risk Analysis and Safety Assessment of UAVs Missions Over the Internet
FIGURE 4. A causal model for predicting UAV risk of crash.
valid from theoretical perspective. In case data is available in
the future, the analyst will be able to derive exact and more
realistic probabilities.
Consequently, in this paper, the data necessary to drive
UAV risk model was collected through a review of previous
research papers [35], [59]–[62], multiple online accident and
incident databases25, and through a general website search26.
This was done by posing this question: what are the common
factors that lead to UAVs accidents and incidents?.
Clothier and Walker [35] used sample data from the U.S.
Department of Defense. This study of military UAVs acci-
dents and common failure categories identified common pilot
error as a cause of 17% accidents, autopilot control module
failure 26% and loss of UAV electrical power 37%. The
principal sources of accidents according to [62] was collected
from an article published by the Washington Post, which
reports that the annual number of crashes has risen over the
past decade, to 26 crashes in 2012 and 21 in 2013, and the
common cause of a crash was loss of UAV electrical power
for 38%, autopilot control module failure 19% and pilot error
factor 17%.
The analysis in [59] was based on summaries of UAV inci-
dents between 2010 and August 2014. This information was
obtained from the Naval Safety Center in Norfolk, Virginia.
Causal factors were related to pilot error factors (65%), 16%
related to system/component failure or malfunction factors,
and 19% related to special factors. In [60], UAV accident data
for the period 1995 - 2005 was taken from the U.S. Army
accident database. These accidents are summarized under
25(1960-2015) Causes of fatal accidents by decade. [Online]. Available:
http://www.planecrashinfo.com/cause.htm.
26(2010-2016) UAV risk analysis. [Online]. Available: http://www.crash-
aerien.news/forum/drones-uav-etudes-des-risques-t35137.html.
system/component failure or malfunction (32%), pilot error
(11%), and weather effect factors (5%).
Belzer [61] analyse data from the UAS database of
accidents and incidents between September 2001 and
July 2016. The three most common errors were flight
crew/pilot error factors at 48%, system/component failure or
malfunction 31% and mid-air collisions 19%. In [63], data
were collected from a 10-year period, 2006 to 2015, sourced
from the FAA Aviation Safety Information Analysis and
Sharing System, NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
and the Civil Aviation Authority. The collected data indicate
that system/component failure or malfunction (63%), pilot
error (15%) and navigation error (GPS loss) (11.53%) were
the most causal factor leading to UAV crashes. Table. 5
summarizes the percentage of common factors contributing
towards the occurrence of UAV crash.
The prior distribution of the root causes of crash risk
(observable nodes) were input to AgenaRisk27 (Bayesian
Network and Simulation Software for Risk Analysis and
Decision Support) to infer the posterior distribution of each
node in BN. Based on the prior contribution of observable
nodes, the joint contribution of the intermediate nodes could
be obtained. The intermediate nodes have several parent
nodes, so their CPT structure is large. AgenaRisk software
was used to mitigate this difficulty, as it helps to calcu-
late the conditional probabilities. It is clarified that due to
the lack of real probability values, which necessitate the
knowledge of exposure rates per factor, we used the fre-
quencies of each factor’s presence in the UAV-related events,
as explained above. Therefore, wherever the term probability
is used, this actually denotes the frequency of contribution
of each factor. Using the parameters defined by AgenaRisk,
27N. Birtles, N. Fenton, M. Neil, and E. Tranham, ‘‘Agenarisk manual
(version 6.1) computer software,’’ 2014.
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TABLE 5. Percentage of causal factors contributing to UAV crash.
FIGURE 5. Joint frequency distribution of risk of crash.
coupled with weights among the nodes defined, probability
values in CPT can be calculated rapidly. Figure 5 shows
the Bayesian network topology and its initial states. Both
intermediate nodes output a set of four ordered states: fre-
quent, probable, occasional and remote. Using the AgenaRisk
software, a UAV crash due to the combination of the inter-
nal and external factors considered will occur with a fre-
quency that is: negligible (60.106%), low (6.456%), medium
(7.128%), high (8.348%) and very high (17.961%) as shown
in Fig. 5.
3) USING THE BN NETWORK TO REASON WITH RISK
The inference algorithms types are predictions, diagnostics,
combined and intercausal [64]. In our case, we were focused
on how to use BN for prediction calculations in order to
demonstrate how hazardous factors identified in previous
sections can affect and change the frequency of occurrence
of a crash given a fault from the list of the causal factors
considered in the study.
a: CAUSAL INFERENCE
Causal inference estimates the posterior probability of a cer-
tain child node of the observed evidence. It is also called
forward inference since the inference direction is from evi-
dence to their child nodes. Causal inferences are made by a
simple query. A simple query computes P(Xi/e), where the
evidence e is the ancestor of Xi. A causal inference is suitable
for finding the probability of a certain fault, or the most
likely fault after updating the evidence [29]. As illustration,
let us take the example of pilot error as evidence in the causal
inference in order to predict what will happen. For example,
after detecting the evidence of pilot error that contributed to
the crash, which means a frequency of 100% for the YES
state, we can update and estimate the posterior distribution of
frequencies of a crash based on that new evidence using the
BN model, causally related to the pilot error. This inference
reveals the extent to which the causal evidence, i.e the pilot
error evidence, affects the posterior contribution to the target
node, i.e ‘‘crash’’. As a result, given that a pilot error is
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FIGURE 6. Scenario one where external sources are considered.
detected, the frequency distribution of a crash is changed:
negligible (51.046%), low (7.44%), medium (8.283%), high
(10.161%) and very high (23.071%). The new frequencies are
easily calculated using the AgenaRisk software by updating
the state of the pilot error to be 0% for FALSE state and 100%
for the TRUE state.
b: DIAGNOSTIC INFERENCE
The diagnostic inference estimates the posterior probabil-
ity of a certain parent node from the observed evidence.
It is called backward inference, since the inference direc-
tion is from evidence to its parents. Like causal inferences,
diagnostic inferences are made by a simple query. A simple
query calculates P(Xi/e), where the evidence e is a child
of Xi. Diagnostic inferences are appropriate for determining
the magnitude of a cause-effect on symptoms [29]. Dif-
ferent from causal inference, diagnostic inference estimates
the posterior probability of a cause node, given an effect
node as evidence. Let us take the crash as an evidence in
the diagnostic inference. For example, we could think of a
simple diagnostic inference query: P(XCE = 1|XFC = 1).
That is, we can estimate the posterior frequency of external
sources under the evidence of crash. As the result of the
query, the distribution of frequencies of external factors is
frequent (42.76%), probable (6.247%), occasional (6.787%)
and remote (44.206%), after finding the evidence of ‘‘crash=
very high’’.
4) SCENARIO ANALYSIS
This section provides two examples that demonstrate the use
of the BNmodel presented in Fig. 4 to identify the parameters
that have high impacts on the risk of crashes and estimate the
frequency distribution of UAV crash.
a: SCENARIO ONE: HYPOTHESES OF EXTERNAL SOURCES
In this scenario, the UAV risk of crash under specific external
conditions is estimated. Four external factors are chosen to
represent the effect of the external source of hazards on
the risk estimation. This scenario is demonstrated in Fig. 6.
The distribution of UAV risk of crash is shown as negli-
gible (29.276%), low (10.076%), medium (11.844%), high
(13.925%) and very high (33.88%), which clearly indicates
a remarkable increase of risk level compared to the prior
distribution. This means, in case of the occurrence of an
external error, the frequency level of a crash increases from
17.961% to 33.88%, which represents a very low safety flight
condition. Of course, this frequency is based on initial fre-
quency distributions assumptions assigned to each observable
state. In the case of real-time safety monitoring, with the use
of probability data and not frequencies as used here due to
unavailability of the former, when the probability of the crash
is very high, the responsible agent will send a command to
activate the riskmitigation techniques summarized in Table. 3
and Table. 4.
b: SCENARIO TWO: HYPOTHESES OF INTERNAL SOURCES
In this scenario, two internal sources of hazards are con-
sidered. The results for this scenario are shown in Fig. 7.
As per the result of the BN model, the distribution of UAV
risk of crash in this scenario can be demonstrated as neg-
ligible (9.315%), low (9.527%), medium (12.866%), high
(19.996%) and very high (48.296%), which is a significant
increase in risk level. The large value of the ‘‘very high’’
state in this scenario indicates that certain risk control options
must be used for these specific conditions in order to miti-
gate or reduce the frequency of crash. It also indicates that
the risks of the crash would become high with only a small
change in the distribution of frequencies.
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FIGURE 7. Scenario two where internal sources are considered.
FIGURE 8. Tornado graph showing which nodes most frequent risk of crash.
5) SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Sensitivity analysis plays an important role in probabilistic
risk assessment, illustrating the performance of each risk fac-
tor’s contribution to the occurrence of crash accidents of UAV.
Considering the BN model of Fig. 4 again, it is interesting to
know what are the nodes that have the greatest contribution
to the node ‘‘crash’’.
AgenaRisk does this automatically by allowing us to select
a target node and any number of other nodes (called sen-
sitivity nodes). So, setting Crash as the target node we
VOLUME 7, 2019 53407
A. Allouch et al.: Qualitative and Quantitative Risk Analysis and Safety Assessment of UAVs Missions Over the Internet
automatically obtain the tornado graph in Fig. 8. From a
purely visual perspective, we can think of the length of the
bars corresponding to each sensitivity node in the tornado
graph as being a measure of the contribution of that node to
the target one. Thus, the node external sources has by far the
most contribution to the node ‘‘crash’’. The formal interpreta-
tion is that the frequency of crash given the result of external
sources go from 0.102 (when external sources’ occurrence
is remote) to 0.531 (when external sources’ occurrence is
frequent). The frequency of crash given the result of internal
sources go from 0.075 (when internal sources’ occurrence is
remote) to 0.502 (when internal sources’ occurrence is fre-
quent). The vertical bar on the graph is themarginal frequency
for crash being very high (0.18).
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides a functional safety methodology for
drone crashes. Two approaches were used. The first approach
followed a qualitative safety risk analysis based on interna-
tional safety standards ISO 12100 and ISO 13849, in which
an analysis was conducted to identify hazards, along with
their possible causes existing safety mitigation methods and
maintaining functional safety recommendations, associated
with proposed UAV application and use case. The sec-
ond approach used a probabilistic model-based risk analysis
method. By using Bayesian Networks, a general crash acci-
dent model was derived, incorporating causal relationships
and conditional probabilities. The use of Bayesian Networks
as a modelling tool well suited to, test and visualize hazard
scenarios, estimate the frequency of UAV crash and enable
identification of the factors that have the greatest contribution
to the occurrence of UAV crash. An example was given, and
the simulation results showed the feasibility of the proposed
methodology.
Future work will extend the experimental evaluations to
include UAV simulations and real flight-testing as a means to
use probability figures instead of frequencies that were used
here for demonstration purposes. By the writer’s opinions and
experiences, the processes of verification and validation of
safety functions are not easy to achieve and get more effective
result. Therefore, in order to get more effective result, we plan
to verify and validate the functional safety system to make
sure that the safety systemmeets the functional requirements,
and are suitable for the risk reduction. We are also investigat-
ing how to implement artificial intelligence and cloud-based
safety assurance modules to allow monitoring and ensuring
the safe operation of drones during their mission.
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